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Protecting the Rights of Public
Employees Under Title VII
and the Free Exercise Clause
Brown v. Polk County, Iowa'
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII protects against religious discrimination in the work place.'
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment guarantees protection
against governmental interference with one's religious practices and beliefs
So, what awaits a public employee who has the opportunity to claim
protection under both of these doctrines? Most likely, a headache. A public
employee bringing such a claim must familiarize himself with three separate
lines of cases.4 The law that has evolved in these areas, however, guarantees
only minimal protection to employees.
The issues addressed in this note focus on establishing burdens. On the
one hand, an employer must prove there is an undue burden in
accommodating an employee's religious activities under Title VII.5 On the
other hand, when alleging a Free Exercise violation, employees must
demonstrate that government actions placed a substantial burden upon their
religious beliefs or practices.6 These burdens constitute the threshold issues
of a public employee's cause of action. Unfortunately, confusion, controversy
and ambiguity surround the interpretation of what is required to establish these
burdens. The purpose of this note is to provide a general overview of the
hoops a public employee must jump through when making a claim under the
Free Exercise Clause and Title VII. A careful analysis of the recent Eighth
Circuit case, Brown v. Polk County, provides an excellent example of the
issues that arise when a public employee brings these claims. This approach
will demonstrate the uncertainty that prevails in dealing with an employee's
right to practice their religious beliefs and the need for clearer guidelines and
more effective protection from both Congress and the courts.
1. 37 F.3d 404 (8th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Brown 1], rev'd, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir.
1995) [hereinafter Brown II], cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1042 (1996).
2. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
4. These cases cover the undue burden analysis of Title VII, the substantial
burden test of the Free Exercise Clause, and a public employee's rights under the First
Amendment's protection of freedom of speech.
5. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
6. See infra text accompanying note 81.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Isaiah Brown, a self-professed, born-again Christian and African-
American male, brought suit against his former employer, Polk County,
alleging that his termination as a county supervisor was the result of racial and
religious discrimination.' Mr. Brown argued that the county's actions
violated his rights under Title VII8 and the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution guaranteeing the free exercise of religion." Specifically,
Brown maintained that Polk County violated his rights "by failing to
accommodate his religious practices and then discharg[ing] him for
participating in... protected activit[ies]."'" These activities included holding
voluntary prayers in his office, referring to scripture during office meetings,
and having a secretary type Bible study notes for him."
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied
Mr. Brown's Title VII claim, finding that Polk County terminated Mr. Brown
on the basis of his work performance, not his race or religion.' 2 The court
went on to state that Polk County "could not have accommodated plaintiffs
7. Brown 11, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982). Part 2(a) of the statute provides:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
9. Brown 11, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995). The First Amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Mr. Brown also made a claim under the Iowa Civil Rights Act. IOWA CODE
§ 216.6 (1993). The court, however, applied the same analysis to this claim as it did
to the Title VII claim. Brown v. Polk County, 832 F. Supp. 1305, 1311 (S.D. Iowa
1993). Therefore, the Iowa claim will not be further analyzed or referred to.
10. Brown v. Polk County, 832 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D. Iowa 1993), aff'd, 37 F.3d
404 (8th Cir. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1042 (1996).
11. Brown 11, 61 F.3d 650, 652 (8th Cir. 1995). See infra notes 130-33 and
accompanying text.
12. Brown v. Polk County, 832 F. Supp. 1305, 1314 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
[Vol. 61
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/9
RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
religious needs without undue hardship."'3  The court rejected Brown's
contention that Polk County violated his First Amendment rights, finding that
Polk County did not "inhibit his ability to freely exercise his religion."' 4 The
Court of Appeals initially affirmed this decision. 5
The Eighth Circuit vacated its opinion when it granted Brown's petition
for a rehearing en banc.' 6 The court, with Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold
writing the decision, 7 reversed the district court on the statutory religious
discrimination claims and Brown's free exercise claim.' Although not
finding all of Brown's activities protected, the court held Polk County failed
to show that they would have suffered an undue hardship had they tried to
accommodate Brown. 9  Furthermore, the court determined that "no
reasonable person could conclude from the evidence presented" that Polk
County would have discharged Brown even if he had not engaged in the
controversial activities.20 The court held Polk County's actions placed a
substantial burden on Brown's religious practices and that Polk County made
no attempt to accommodate Brown or limit its interference of Brown's
religious activities.2' In accordance with these findings, the court held that
Polk County was liable to Brown for violating Title VII and for infringing
upon his rights under the Free Exercise Clause.'
13. Id.
14. Id. The court also dismissed Brown's equal protection claim, finding that
Polk County's policies as to religious proselytizing and counseling applied to all
employees. Id. at 1316.
15. Brown I, 37 F.3d 404 (8th Cir. 1994). Judge Fagg wrote the majority
opinion. Id.
16. Brown 1, 37 F.3d 404 (8th Cir. 1994).
17. Judge Arnold dissented from the Court of Appeals's decision in Brown L Id.
at 411 (Arnold, J., dissenting).
18. Brown 11, 61 F.3d 650, 658 (8th Cir. 1995). The court did affirm the lower
court's decision in regards to the statutory race claim. Id. at 653. The court remanded
the case to the district court "for consideration of the appropriate relief." Id. at 658.
19. Id. at 657.
20. Id. See infra notes 123 and 128 and accompanying text. The dissent
disagreed with this finding, believing that, at a minimum, this issue should be
remanded to the trial court. Brown HI, 61 F.3d at 660 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 659. Judge Fagg, echoing his reasoning in Brown 1, insisted that Mr.
Brown failed to satisfy the threshold requirement of proving that the government
substantially burdened his religious practices. id. Therefore, further analysis of his
constitutional claim, as to whether Polk County attempted to accommodate Brown, was
unwarranted. Id. at 660 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
22. Brown 11, 61 F.3d at 651.
1996]
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III. LEGAL HISTORY
A. Title VII and the
Undue Burden Analysis'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from
discriminating, on the basis of religion, against an individual with "respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."2 4 In
1967, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission revised its Title VII
guidelines to state that an employer has a duty to reasonably accommodate an
employee's religious practices, unless the accommodation would result in an
"undue hardship" on the employer.2 5 In 1972, Congress, trying to provide
additional guidance under Title VII, supplemented Title VII with the EEOC's
1967 "undue hardship" proposals.26 The EEOC guidelines provide additional
guidance on an employee's and employer's duties under Title VII,27
suggestions as to how an employer can accommodate religious practices,2 8
and comments on what constitutes an "undue burden." '29
23. Unlike a free exercise claim brought by a public employee, the Title VII
analysis is flexible. Under Title VII, the special concerns that arise when dealing with
a public employee can be taken into account in determining whether the employer was
forced to incur an undue burden. See infra text accompanjying note 98.
24. See supra note 8.
25. 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (1995) (citing 29 C.F.R. 1605.1(b)(c), 32 FR 10298).
26. 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (1995). Congress's amendment provided: "The term
'religion' includes all aspects of religious observances and practice, as well as belief,
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." 42 U.S.C. § 2000ea) (1972).
27. This guideline requires that an employee must first provide notice to the
employer of his/her need for accommodation. The commission states that "when there
is more than one means of accommodation which would not cause undue hardship, the
employer . . . must offer the alternative which least disadvantages [the
employee] . . .29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(ii) (July 1995). This provision was given a very
"employer friendly" interpretation in Ansonia Board of Educ. v. Philbrook 479 U.S.
60 (1986). See infra notes 41-46 and accompanying discussion.
28. The commission suggests that arrangements could be made for "voluntary
substitutions and 'swaps,' flexible scheduling, [and] lateral transfer and change ofjob
assignments." 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(i)-(iii) (1995).
29. The Commission adopted the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, requiring the employer to incur more than a de
minimis cost. The Commission also presumes that an employer can accommodate an
employee's religious practices through "the infrequent payment of premium wages
while a more permanent accommodation is being sought." 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)
[Vol. 61
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The Supreme Court first considered an employer's obligations under Title
VII in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison.3" The Hardison case dealt
with a conflict that arose when an employee, due to religious beliefs, refused
to work on the Sabbath.3' Trans World Airlines temporarily accommodated
Hardison's beliefs by transferring him to a different shift.32 After these
arrangements failed, and Hardison refused to work on Saturdays, TWA fired
him for "refusing to work his designated shift.
33
Hardison maintained that because his religious beliefs prohibited him
from working the Sabbath, his termination placed TWA in violation of Title
VII. 34  The Court held that an employer is burdened with an "undue
hardship" if it is "to bear more than a de minimis cost. '35 The Supreme
Court found that allowing Hardison every Saturday off subjected TWA to an
undue burden.36 The Court also refused to require TWA to accommodate
Hardison "by taking steps inconsistent with [an] otherwise valid [collective
bargaining agreement]. 37
The Court held that allowing Hardison to work only four days per week
required TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost.38 The court established
the principle that "costs in the form of lost efficiency in other jobs and costs
(1995). In addition, the Commission assumes that administrative costs incurred in the
accommodation of an employee are not to be considered "more than a de minimis
cost." 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e) (1995).
30. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
31. Id. at 63. Hardison was a member of the Worldwide Church of God. Id. at
67. As called for under the Church's tenets, Hardison refused to work from "sunset
on Friday until sunset on Saturday." Id.
32. Id. at 68. Problems arose, however, when TWA granted Hardison's request
for transfer to a different building. Id. After the transfer to the new building,
Hardison lacked sufficient seniority to maneuver around working on Saturdays. Id. at
68. The collective bargaining agreement provided for a seniority system which
determined who had first choice to choose and switch job assignments. Id. at 79. The
union refused to violate the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement
and TWA rejected Hardison's request that he work only four days a week. Id.
33. Id. at 69.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 84.
36. Id. at 84. The Court's decision reversed the Eighth Circuit, which held that
TWA failed to reasonably accommodate Hardison's religious beliefs. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).
37. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. The
Court, however, emphasized that collective bargaining agreements and/or seniority
systems "can not be employed to violate" Title VII. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79.
38. Id. at 84. The Court determined that Hardison's position at TWA was
essential and he was the "only individual on his shift who could perform it." Id. at 68.
19961
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in the form of higher wages could amount to more than de minimis costs." 39
Recognizing that Title VII's primary purpose is to prevent discrimination, the
Court stated: "In the absence of clear statutory language or legislative history
to the contrary, we will not readily construe the statute to require an employer
to discriminate against some employees in order to enable others to observe
their Sabbath., 40  With Hardison, the Supreme Court laid out its first
guidelines as to what protection employees were entitled and what duties were
expected of an employer, under the undue burden standard of Title VII.
The Supreme Court next addressed an employer's duty under Title VII
in Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook.4' The Court in Philbrook
further narrowed an employer's duty to accommodate an employee's religious
beliefs. Philbrook held that Title VII does not require an employer to
consider the reasonable accommodations preferred or suggested by the
employee.42 The Court found that once the employer demonstrates that it
provided reasonable accommodations for the employee, the "statutory inquiry
is at an end.
43
Although the Court's holding was not of direct importance to the Brown
v. Polk County decision," the Court's apparent eagerness to grant the
employer this additional discretion is significant. This decision was reached
in spite of EEOC guidelines which advise employers, when accommodating
an employee and faced with more than one "reasonable" alternative, to
39. Henry Earle III & James R. McPherson, Religious Discrimination in
Employment: Employer's Duty to Accommodate Employee's Refusal to Work
Scheduled Hours, 1987 DET. C.L. REV. 765, 778 (1987).
40. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 85.
41. 479 U.S. 60 (1986). Philbrook was a teacher who, due to his religious
beliefs, was forced to miss six days of school a year. Id. at 63. "Under [the]
collective bargaining agreement. .. teachers were granted three days annual leave for
observance of religious holidays, but could not use for religious observance any
accumulated sick leave, [or personal days] ... [Philbrook] repeatedly asked the Board
either to adopt the policy of allowing use of the three days of personal business leave
for religious observance or, in the alternative, to allow him to pay the cost of a
substitute and receive full pay for additional days off for religious observances..."
Id. at 60.
The Court "assumed that the Board's leave policy constituted a reasonable
accommodation of [Philbrook's] belief." Id.
42. Id. at 69.
43. Id. at 68.
44. Polk County made no attempt to accommodate Mr. Brown's religious beliefs.
Brown I, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995). The Eighth Circuit, however, has certainly not
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implement the accommodation which "least disadvantages" the employee.4"
The Court, on the other hand, believed that if the guidelines did call for the
"employer to accept any alternative favored by the employee short of undue
hardship" then the guidelines were "simply inconsistent with the plain meaning
of the statute."46 Laurel Bedig, writing for the Brooklyn Law Review,
believes the result reached in Philbrook "is difficult to reconcile with any
meaningful application of Title VII ... [and] instead of fostering adequate
accommodation, inhibits even the consideration of viable alternative
accommodations contrary to the purpose and spirit of Title VII."47
The Eighth Circuit in Cook v. Chrysler Corporation.4" faced facts
similar to those found in Hardison.49 The court, holding for Chrysler,
refused to require Chrysler to violate a collective bargaining agreement.5"
The court also upheld the district court's findings that Chrysler would incur
more than a de minimis cost in providing alternative accommodations for
45. See supra note 27 and accompanying text; see 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c)(ii)
(1995).
46. Ansonia Board of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 n.6 (1986). The Court,
overturning the court of appeal's decision, wrote:
Though superficially consistent with the burden imposed by the Court of
Appeals, this guideline, by requiring the employer to choose the option that
least disadvantages an individual's employment opportunities, contains a
significant limitation not found in the court's standard. To this extent that
the guideline, like the approach of the Court of Appeals, requires the
employer to accept any alternative favored by the employee short of undue
hardship, we find the guideline simply inconsistent with the plain meaning
of the statute. We have of course, noted the EEOC guidelines are properly
accorded less weight than administrative regulations declared by Congress
to have the force of law.
Id.
47. Laurel A. Bedig, The Supreme Court Narrows an Employer's Duty to
Accommodate an Employee 's Religious Practices Under Title VII, 53 BROOK. L. REV.
245, 260 (1987).
48. 981 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1992).
49. Mr. Cook, a Seventh Day Adventist, was an employee of Chrysler who
refused to work on the Sabbath. Id. at 337. As was the case in Hardison, a seniority
system included in the Union's collective bargaining agreement prevented Mr. Cook
from changing shifts to avoid working on Friday evenings. Id. at 338. After
Chrysler's attempts to accommodate Mr. Cook failed, and Mr. Cook refused to work
his scheduled shifts on Friday evenings, Chrysler fired Mr. Cook. Id.
50. Id. at 338. The court stated that an employer is not obligated under Title VII
to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs if the accommodations either "1)
compromises other employee's contractual seniority rights as secured by a collective
bargaining agreement; or 2) confers a privilege, the cost of which is more than de
minimis solely on the basis of the recipient's religious beliefs." Id.
1996]
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Mr. Cook's religious beliefs."' The court stated "[t]he costs, although not
ascertained with exactitude, were present and real."52 In so holding, the
court rejected Mr. Cook's argument that the costs should be "quantifiable. "s3
The court found that other proposed alternatives would result in significant
costs to Chrysler." The Eighth Circuit again found for the employer in
Wilson v. U.S. West Communications."5 In Wilson, the court rejected the
complaint of a woman who claimed that her employer violated Title VII after
prohibiting her from wearing an anti-abortion button, which contained a
photograph of a fetus.56 Wilson maintained that "if she took off the button
she would compromise her vow and lose her soul."57 Citing disruptions at
work and the employer's offering of a reasonable accommodation,58 the court
held that Ms. Wilson's discharge did not violate Title VII.59 The court
51. Cook, 981 F.2d at 336. The court believed that Chrysler presented "tangible
evidence" that it would incur more than a de minimis costs. Id. at 339. The court did
acknowledge, however, that if in the trial court's shoes, it "might have reached another
conclusion." Id.
52. Id. at 339. The court found Cook's proposal that he be allowed every Friday
off unacceptable because he then became "a part-time employee with full-time
benefits." Id. Chrysler presented evidence that this would result in a cost of about
$1500 a year. Id. The court also believed that requiring Chrysler to use a part-time
employee every Friday would result in inefficiency because "there is no way to
guarantee the same [replacement would] replace Cook without hiring a new [part-time
employee]. Id. Finally, the possibility of Cook working on Sundays instead of
Fridays was undesirable because the "collective bargaining agreement required over-
time pay on weekends and the plant was normally closed on Sundays. Id.
53. Id. Mr. Cook contended that the Eight Circuit's decision in Brown v. General
Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1979) required that "additional costs must be
quantifiable." Id. The Court rejected this argument stating that Brown "stands only
for the proposition that an accommodation 'must mean present undue hardship, as
distinguished from anticipated or multiplied hardship."' Id. (quoting Brown, 601 F.2d
at 961).
54. Id. at 339. The court noted that the "shift change" was prohibited by the
collective bargaining agreement. Id. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
55. 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995).
56. Id. at 1339. Wilson made a religious vow that she would wear this button
"until there was an end to abortion or until [she] could no longer fight the fight." She
wore the button continually (unless sleeping or bathing), because "she wanted to be an
instrument of God like the Virgin Mary." Id. After being told that she could not wear
the button, Ms. Wilson refused to come to work and was eventually fired. Id.
57. Id.
58. The employer proposed that Ms. Wilson wear the button while working in her
cubicle, but cover it when walking around the office. Id.
59. Id. at 1342.
[Vol. 61
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/9
RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
stated, "Because we hold that [the employer] offered Wilson a reasonable
accommodation, our inquiry ends ....
B. Free Exercise Claim6'
It is undisputed that the free exercise of religion qualifies as a
fundamental constitutional right.62 Courts generally subject government
regulations or practices that interfere with fundamental constitutional rights
to strict scrutiny analysis.63  To survive strict scrutiny, the action or
regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.'
The Court applied the strict scrutiny test to free exercise claims in Sherbert v.
Verner" and Connick v. Myers.' In Sherbert, the employer terminated
claimant's employment because of her refusal to work on Saturday, the
Sabbath Day of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.67 Subsequently, the state
denied her unemployment benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment
Compensation Act.68  Sherbert argued that the Commission's refusal of
60. Id. at 1342. Thus, the court applied the rule enunciated in Ansonia Board
of Educ. v. Philbrook. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying discussion.
61. It should be recognized at the outset that this line of cases deals with the
approach taken by the courts in dealing with Free Exercise claims brought by private
citizens. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how the courts treat claims that
the state infringed upon one's Free Exercise rights. There are cases included in this
section that deal with public employees; however, the courts, for various reasons,
found no reason to deviate from the strict scrutiny analysis it traditionally applies to
a private citizen's claim. See infra notes 87, 90-95 and accompanying text. Section
C, infra, discusses those instances when, dealing with public employees, a court has
found a slightly different analysis appropriate.
62. Brown 11, 61 F.3d at 658 (citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14
(1974)).
63. See McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994).
64. Id. The Supreme Court, however, has applied a slightly different analysis to
the regulation of the fundamental constitutional rights of public employees. Id.
Unfortunately, the Court has yet to determine what analysis to apply to a public
employee's free exercise claim. This subject is discussed infra at part C.
65. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
66. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
67. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399.
68. Id. at 401. The act mandated that a claimant is not entitled to benefits "if.
he has failed, without good cause ... to accept available suitable work when
offered him by the employment office of the employee ...." Id. at 402 (quoting S.C.
CODE, tit. 68, §§ 68-114(3)). The Employment Security Commission found this clause
applicable to Sherbert's situation and declared her ineligible for benefits. Id.
1996]
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benefits violated her constitutional rights under the Free Exercise Clause.69
Subjecting South Carolina's actions to strict scrutiny, the Court
maintained that the state action must either constitute no infringement "of their
constitutional rights of free exercise," or be justified by a "compelling state
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power
to regulate. '  The Court held that South Carolina's refusal to grant Ms.
Sherbert unemployment benefits was a substantial burden on her rights under
the First Amendment.7' In addition, the Court found no compelling state
interest to justify the burden.7" The Court stressed that, because its holding
did not favor one religion over another, the Establishment Clause was not
violated.7'
Nearly twenty years later the Supreme Court relied upon its Sherbert
holding in Thomas v. Review Board, Indiana Employment Security
Division.74 Mr. Thomas quit his job with an Indiana company after the
company transferred him to a position that involved the production of military
tanks." Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness, maintained that his religious beliefs
prohibited him from working on the production of materials for war.76
Indiana, acting pursuant to a disqualifying clause in the Indiana Employment
Security Act, denied Mr. Thomas unemployment benefits.77 The Indiana
Supreme Court denied Mr. Thomas' free exercise claim on several grounds,
one of which was that the Employment Act was not intended to provide
benefits to those who terminated their employment voluntarily.78
This case is of particular interest in that the U.S. Supreme Court tried to
define what constitutes a constitutionally protected religious belief.79 The
69. Id.
70. Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
71. Id. The Court found a substantial burden in spite of its recognition that the
burden involved, not receiving a state benefit, was an indirect burden. Id. at 404.
The Court stated that the condition upon the benefits operated to "inhibit or deter the
exercise of First Amendment freedoms." Id.
72. Id. at 407. The Court found no evidence to demonstrate the legitimacy of the
state's purported interest in avoiding fraudulent claims. Id. at 407-09. The Court went
on to write that even if such evidence had been presented, the State would have the
burden of proving "no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses
without infringing First Amendment rights." Id. at 407.
73. Id.
74. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
75. Id. at 709.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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Indiana court's holding relied, in part, on the fact that Thomas was unclear
about his beliefs and the basis for these beliefs.8" Concluding that Thomas's
beliefs were indicative of a personal philosophy and not a religious one,8 the
court held that the Free Exercise Clause afforded Thomas no protection.82
The Supreme Court acknowledged that a claim could be so unusual and
obviously nonreligious in motivation so as to render it unworthy of
constitutional protection. 3 The Court in Thomas, however, relied on the
general principle that "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical,
consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection."84 Applying this principle to the facts in Thomas, the Court
found Thomas's position to be grounded in legitimate religious beliefs.85
The Court compared the burden placed on Mr. Thomas to that found in
Sherbert stating, "the coercive impact on Thomas is indistinguishable from
Sherbert."8 The Court then provided the following guideline as to when a
substantial burden exists:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct
proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of
conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden
upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the
infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.87
80. Id.
81. Id. at 714.
82. Id. at 713. The Indiana court argued that even if Thomas had quit for
religious reasons, he still was not entitled to protection. Id The court found there was
only an indirect burden, "justified by the legitimate state interest in preserving the
integrity of the insurance fund and maintaining a stable work force by encouraging
workers not to leave their job for personal reasons." Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 714. The Indiana court found significance in the fact that other
Jehovah's witnesses performed the same type of work Mr. Thomas refused to do. The
Supreme Court, however, observed that "intra-faith" differences could also be entitled
to protection. Id.
85. Id. at 716.
86. Id. at 717. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
87. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18. The Ninth Circuit quoted this definition of a
substantial burden when evaluating a free exercise claim brought by a Los Angeles
police officer. Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir. 1994).
The court noted that before applying the balancing test and compelling state interest
analysis, Sherbert mandates that a claimant "must first establish that government has
placed a substantial burden on his or her free exercise of religion." Id. at 1392-93.
The court held that the police officer failed to establish that a substantial burden had
1996]
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After finding a burden upon Thomas' religious rights under the Free
Exercise Clause, the Court went on to hold that the State had not shown that
its activities, which burdened these rights, were "the least restrictive means of
achieving some compelling state interest."'88 The Thomas court, "unprepared
to overrule Sherbert," held that the State could not deny Mr. Thomas
unemployment benefits because "he terminated his employment because of his
religious convictions.1
89
The Eighth Circuit in Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power District"
outlined the Supreme Court's "three part test" for evaluating claims brought
under the Free Exercise Clause.9' The claimants in Rushton lost their jobs
after refusing, on religious grounds, to take a urinalysis as part of a drug
test.92 The claimants were public employees at a Nebraska nuclear
station.93 The court did not consider whether the government regulation
constituted a substantial burden nor did it consider deviating from the strict
scrutiny analysis to recognize the state interest in operating as an employer.94
The court simply determined that the State's compelling interest in the health
and safety of its citizens and employees justified any burden which may have
been placed upon the claimants. 95
been placed upon his Free Exercise rights. Id. Thus, the court was required to
proceed no further in its constitutional analysis. Id.
88. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718-719. The Court rejected arguments that Indiana had
a compelling interest in avoiding the unemployment that may result if individuals were
allowed to terminate their employment for personal reasons. Id. at 719. The Court
similarly dismissed Indiana's claim that it had a compelling interest in avoiding "a
detailed probing by employers into job applicant's religious beliefs." Id.
89. Id. at 720. As in Sherbert, the Court also found there to be no Establishment
Clause violation in its holding.
90. 844 F.2d 562, 564 (8th Cir. 1988).
91. In summary: (1) does the government regulation directly or indirectly burden
an individual's religious practice? (2) is there a government interest which justifies
the burden? (3) is the chosen regulation the "least restrictive means" that can be used
to accomplish the state's purpose? Id.
92. Id. at 563. The claimants did not object to the drug testing itself but to the
statement of policy found in the Program, which recognized alcoholism as an illness.
Id. at 564. The claimants believed alcoholism to be a sin and that, in accordance with
their beliefs as conservative Christians, they "must separate themselves from heretical
doctrines, such as the notion that alcoholism is a disease." Id.
93. Id. at 563.
94. Id. at 564.
95. Id. The Court also recognized the "ratepayer's" economic interest. Id.
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C. A Public Employee's Rights
Under the First Amendment
The court in Brown I noted: "The Supreme Court has never identified
a legal analysis governing whether an adverse employment action infringes a
public employee's right to free exercise of religion. 96 When evaluating the
constitutionality of government action which impacts a public employee's
speech, however, the Supreme Court applies the Pickering analysis97. This
balancing test provides greater discretion to a state employer to make
regulations which may otherwise violate an individual's constitutional rights.
The court in Pickering v. Board of Education, when examining a public
school teacher's right to free speech, held:
The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of
the teacher, as a citizen, commenting on matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees. 98
As Craig Singer observed, writing for the University of Chicago Law
Review, the Court recognizes various state interests that are balanced against
the public employee's First Amendment rights. 9  Among these are the
speech's effect on discipline, the harmony among co-workers, the employee's
job performance and the "impact on the general operation of the employer's
enterprise.""' In spite of these interests, the Court in Pickering held the
teacher's statements "regarded matters of public concern and presented no
questions of faculty discipline or harmony," therefore, the State could not,
consistent with the First Amendment, discharge the teacher on the basis of his
statements.10'
The Court later emphasized that its holding in Pickering applied only to
those cases involving speech which is a matter of public concern. 0 2 The
Court stated that its "responsibility is to ensure that citizens are not deprived
96. Brown 1, 37 F.3d 404, 408 (8th Cir. 1994).
97. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 319 U.S. 563 (1968). Deviating from the strict
scrutiny analysis, the Court focuses on the need to balance the constitutional rights of
the individual against "the interests of the state, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services its performs through its employees." Id.
98. Id. at 568.
99. Craig D. Singer, Conduct and Belief: Public Employee's Rights to Free
Expression and Political Affiliation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 897, 950 (1992).
100. Id at 900.
101. Pickering, 319 U.S. at 564.
102. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983).
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of fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government .... ,o
The Court recognized that the Pickering balance "requires full consideration
of the government's interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its
responsibilities to the public."' '  In order to meet this duty, the Court
recognized that a government employer
must have wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel
and internal affairs. This includes the prerogative to remove employees
whose conduct hinders efficient operation .... Prolonged retention of a
disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee can adversely affect
discipline and morale in the work place, foster disharmony, and ultimately
impair the efficiency of an office or agency. 05
The Court held that the government did not violate the employee's
constitutional rights."6 The Court further stated it would not require the
government to tolerate activity, which deserved only limited First Amendment
protection, that may "disrupt the office, undermine [the employer's] authority,
and destroy close working relationships." 0 7 The Court based its decision
on two factors: the "practical realities involved in the administration of a
government office"; and the First Amendment's "primary aim," which is the
protection of speech dealing with issues of public concern. 8
When analyzing a free exercise claim brought by a public employee,
there are a number of factors and standards to consider. First, one should
begin by determining whether the government's action placed a burden upon
the employee's religious practice."' Next, one should look to see whether
there is a compelling state interest to justify the action and, if so, whether the
state's regulations are narrowly tailored to achieve the government's interest.
If the employee still has a cognizable claim after the traditional strict scrutiny
analysis, one should next look to the "modified Pickering afialysis." Here, the
individual's interests in having his religious beliefs and practices protected are
balanced against the State's interests in operating as an efficient employer and
avoiding a violation of the Establishment Clause. Only after jumping through
these hoops is a public employee likely to receive constitutional protection
under the Free Exercise Clause.
103. Id at 147.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 151 (quoting Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1978) (Powell,
J., concurring)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 154.
108. Id.
109. Of course, state action is the threshold requirement in bringing a Free
Exercise claim. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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III. INSTANT DECISION
A. Brown I
In Brown I, the majority found that Polk County's firing of Mr. Brown
neither violated Title VII nor infringed upon his rights under the First
Amendment."0 In so holding, the court rejected Mr. Brown's claim that
Polk County's reprimand, which prohibited him from engaging in religious
proselytizing or counseling while at work, was a violation of his rights under
the Free Exercise Clause."' The court focused on the distinction between
religious beliefs, which receive absolute protection, and religious conduct."'
The court found that Polk County's demand-that Mr. Brown remove
religious items from his office-did not substantially burden Brown's religious
practice so as to constitute a violation of the First Amendment."' The court
relied upon the following standard: "the burden must be more than an
inconvenience; the burden must rise to the level of pressuring the adherent to
commit an act the religion forbids, or preventing the adherent from engaging
in conduct that the faith requires.""' 4
According to the majority, Brown failed to satisfy this threshold
requirement." 5 Despite this finding, the court evaluated the merits of Mr.
Brown's claim. In determining what protection to afford Mr. Brown's
religious conduct, the court found the lower court's use of a modified
110. Brown v. Polk County, Iowa, 37 F.3d 404, 406 (8th Cir. 1994), rev'd 61
F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1042 (1996). The court also held
that Polk County did not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when dismissing Mr. Brown from
his position as director of County Information Services. Id.
111. Id. at 410. In this reprimand, Polk County demanded that Mr. Brown "end
his role in all religious activities on County time and to see that employees in the
department did the same." Brown v. Polk County, 832 F. Supp. 1305, 1309 (S.D.
Iowa 1993). Polk County also instructed Mr. Brown to "cease all religious
proselytizing, witnessing or counseling at work." Brown I, 37 F.3d 404, 410 (8th Cir.
1994).
112. The court found that Polk County's reprimand addressed only Mr. Brown's
conduct, not his beliefs. Id. at 409.
113. Id. at 410. After attending a departmental meeting in Mr. Brown's office,
Ray Sears, Mr. Brown's supervisor, demanded that Brown remove all religious items
from his office. Brown v. Polk County, 832 F. Supp. 1305, 1310 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
Among those items ordered removed were several plaques and posters, a ceramic item
that contained the Lord's prayer, and a small Bible. Id. Mr. Sears expressed concern
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Pickering analysis appropriate. 16 Finding no reason to distinguish between
free exercise rights and free speech rights,"7 the court wrote: "[a]pplication
of the modified Pickering analysis in this case takes into account the
disruptive potential of Brown's open free exercise conduct in the work place
. . . and best considers the tension Polk County faced between not
establishing or promoting religion and not inhibiting its practice.""
8
Applying this balancing test, the court believed that Polk County's
interests outweighed Mr. Brown's right to participate in the types of conduct
for which he was reprimanded." 9 Consequently, the court affirmed the
lower court's decision that "the balance interests tips in Polk County's
favor."1
20
The majority made short work of Brown's Title VII claim.'' The
court refused to address whether "Polk County could have accommodated
Brown's religious activities and expression without undue hardship."'" The
court upheld the lower court's finding that the County terminated Mr. Brown
on the basis of his work performance, not race or religion."p Upon finding
116. Id. at 413. See supra section III. C.
117. Pickering addressed a public employee's free speech claim. See supra notes
97-99.
118. Brown1, 37 F.3d at 409.
119. Id. at 410. The court also stressed that Brown's position as supervisor of
fifty employees and the Free Exercise rights of the other employees were important
factors to consider. Id.
120. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that Polk County's "compelling interest"
in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation rendered their actions justifiable even
under a strict scrutiny analysis. Id.
121. Id. at 411.
122. Id.
123. Id. The court did not believe that this decision was "clearly erroneous,"
finding that Brown failed to show any direct evidence that Polk County based the
discharge on religion or race. Id.
The Brown II court found that Mr. Brown met his burden to invoke a mixed
motives analysis, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), by
demonstrating that Brown's religious activities were a factor in the decision to fire Mr.
Brown. Brown 11, 61 F.3d at 657. The court, dismissed the trial court's and
Brown I's reasoning, holding that "no reasonable person could conclude from the
evidence presented that the defendants would have fired Mr. Brown anyway." Id.
Price Waterhouse stands for the proposition that when a "plaintiff in [a] Title VII
case proves that her gender played [a] part in [an] employment decision," the burden
shifts to the employer to prove by "preponderance of evidence that it would have made
the same decision even if it had not taken plaintiff's gender into account." Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Judge Fagg believed that Polk County satisfied this burden. Brown 11, 61 F.3d
at 661 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
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that Brown's claim did not meet this threshold requirement, the Court declined
to give further consideration to his Title VII claim."
B. Brown 11
The Eighth Circuit vacated the Brown I decision when it granted Brown's
petition for a rehearing en banc. 2 5 Brown 1I rejected Brown I's holding that
Polk County could not be held liable for its actions under the First
Amendment or Title VII.2 6 In contrast to Brown I, Brown II carefully
scrutinized Polk County's actions under both the Free Exercise Clause and
Title VII. Noting the different standards involved in a Title VII and First
Amendment claim, the court stated "that any religious activities of employees
that can be accommodated without undue hardship to the governmental
employer ... are also protected by the First Amendment." 7
The court overturned the district court's dismissal of the Title VII claim,
finding "inadequate proof' that Brown would have been fired despite his
religious activities.' This decision allowed the court to determine if Polk
County could have accommodated Brown's religious activities without an
undue hardship.2 9 The court applied the Title VII analysis to the following
actions "attributed to" Brown. 3 These incidents included:
directing a secretary to type his Bible study notes', allowing prayers in
his office before the start of the workday'32, allowing prayers in his office
124. Brown 11, 61 F.3d at 661.
125. Brown 1, 37 F.3d at 404.
126. Brown II, 61 F.3d 650, 651-52 (8th Cir. 1995).
127. Id. at 654. In other words, "if a governmental employer has violated Title
VII, it has also violated the guarantees of the First Amendment." Id.
128. Id. Polk County formally reprimanded several incidents of "religious
conduct." See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
129. Brown II, 61 F.3d at 654.
130. Id. at 655. These actions came from a Polk County investigation of Brown's
religious activities, which eventually formed the basis of his first reprimand. Id. at
652.
131. The court struggled little in finding that neither Title VII nor the First
Amendment protected Brown's request to have his Bible study notes typed by a county
secretary. The court observed that the secretary's time would be taken away from
work that could otherwise be done for the county. Id. Subsequently, Polk County
would be forced to bear more than a de minimis cost to accommodate Mr. Brown. Id.
at 656. The court went on to say that Brown's actions were not entitled to protection
under the Free Exercise Clause, stating it would be "surprised if directing a county
employee to type Bible study notes is 'conduct mandated by religious belief."' Id.
132. The court also found that Mr. Brown's voluntary prayers, prior to the start
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during department meetings, and affirming his Christianity and referring to
Bible passages about slothfulness and 'work ethics' during one department
meeting.'
The critical issues in the Brown II decision revolved around the voluntary
prayers, affirmations of Christianity, and references to Bible passages that took
place in department meetings held by Mr. Brown.'34 The court found there
to be no evidence that Polk County would be forced to bear an "undue
burden" in accommodating, or tolerating, these types of actions.' The
court rejected Polk County's contentions that these activities would result in
a division of the work force between Christians and non-Christians, and the
perception, among employees, that Mr. Brown may favor Christians when
making personnel decisions.' The court, unimpressed with "potential
effects,"'3 7 stated that the burdens Polk County complained of were
"insufficiently 'real'' and "too 'hypothetical.' ' 'i18
Although reaching a different decision than Brown I, Brown II also found
a modified Pickering analysis appropriate in Free Exercise claims brought by
public employees.3 9 The two decisions, however, have little else in
common. The most important difference between the two decisions is Brown
II's application of a more flexible substantial burden standard. In order to
establish a substantial burden, the court required Mr. Brown to show that the
of the workday, were not entitled to either statutory or constitutional protection. Id.
at 656. The court noted that Title VII does not demand that an employer open its
premises prior to the "start of a workday." Id.
133. Id. at 655.
134. Id. at 656.
135. Id. at 657.
136. Id. at 656-57. The court found that "no evidence whatsoever was presented
... to show that Mr. Brown's personnel decisions actually were affected by his
religious beliefs or that employee concerns were ... legitimate." Id.
137. The court pointed to employee testimony that any division that existed
between Christians and non-Christians had no effect on work and that "any moral
problems in Mr. Brown's department stemmed from 'disagreements about how [the
work] should be done,"' as opposed to religious issues. Id. at 657.
138. Id. The court, however, noted Polk County could avoid liability if it could
prove it would have fired Mr. Brown despite his protected activity. See supra note
123 and accompanying text.
139. Brown I, 61 F.3d at 658. See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
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"burdens placed on him were not inconsiderable."'40  The court held that
Mr. Brown satisfied this burden.'
Before becoming involved in a lengthy balancing of Mr. Brown's and
Polk County's rights, the court pointed to the requirement that "any
interference with religious activity . . must be narrowly tailored" to the
achievement of the government's interest. 4 ' The court found that:
Here, there was not the least attempt to confine the prohibition to harassing
or intimidating speech. Instead, Polk County baldly directed Mr. Brown to
cease any activities that could be considered to be religious proselytizing,
witnessing or counseling. That order exhibited a hostility to religion that
our Constitution simply prohibits.'43
Relying on Polk County's lack of effort to confine its restrictions, and the
absence of any showing of disruption of work, the court also found the order
to remove all religious items from Mr. Brown's office unconstitutional.'"
The court rejected Polk County's argument that its interests in avoiding an
Establishment Clause violation justified its actions.'45 The court refused to
140. Brown 11, 61 F.3d at 658. The court relied on evidence that religious beliefs
were extremely important to Mr. Brown and that he found Polk County's actions
"oppressive and vexatious." Id. The court stated that the lower court's failure to find
that a substantial burden had been shown "either proceeds from a misunderstanding of
what a substantial burden is, or is a clearly erroneous finding of fact." Id
141. Id. The dissent vigorously attacked this finding, adhering to the substantial
burden standard of Brown I, see supra note 114 and accompanying text. Judge Fagg
argued: "The fact that Brown sincerely held his religious belief does not mean the
County's actions substantially burdened Brown's exercise of those beliefs." Brown II,
61 F.3d at 660 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 659. The court acknowledged the Pickering court's concerns that "the
effective functioning of the public employer's enterprise is not interfered with." Id.
at 658 (quoting Rankin v. McPhearson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987)). The court noted
that no such interference with Polk County's operation resulted from any of Mr.
Brown's forbidden actions.
The court also recognized "for the sake of argument" Polk County's right "to
ensure that its work place is free from religious activity that harasses or intimidates."
Id. at 659.
143. Id.
144. Id. The court found that this demand revealed the "zealotry of the county
administrator." Id. The court went on to say that the administrator's concern that
employees might find the items offensive was insufficient to justify the demand. Id.
The court reasoned that if Polk County was to order removal on this basis, they would
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allow the Establishment Clause to "trump" the Free Exercise Clause. 4 6
Thus, Brown 1, although applying the same balancing test as the majority in
Brown I, found that Polk County violated Mr. Brown's rights under the Free
Exercise Clause.
IV. COMMENT
The decisions discussing and interpreting what constitutes an undue
burden under Title VII and a substantial burden under the Free Exercise
Clause have left employees' religious practices little protection.'47 As seen
in the cases discussed in the Legal History, the law that has evolved covering
these standards allows courts to continually limit an employee's rights to
practice his religious beliefs and has forced courts, determined to provide the
employees with protection, to stretch existing precedent.
The de minimis cost requirement set out in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison lowered the standard of compliance with Title VII, thereby
undermining the purposes of Title VII. Furthermore, the Court in Hardison
failed to clearly articulate its expectations of employers. This has led to
varying and inconsistent interpretations from the courts.'48 The Supreme
146. Id Judge Fagg believed that Polk County's interest in avoiding an
Establishment Clause violation justified its actions. He insisted that "Polk County had
an overriding compelling interest in restricting religious practices in the workplace:
avoidance of an Establishment Clause violation." Brown 1, 37 F.3d at 410.
147. The legislative branch, however, has recently shown a spark of interest in
protecting employees' religious beliefs, whereas the EEOC's recent involvement in this
area has resulted in controversy. After proposing to "extend its sexual harassment
guidelines to race, religion, national origin age, and disability" the Commission was
met with widespread criticism from both liberals and conservatives. DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) 123 d6 (June 29, 1994). Rep. Charles Taylor stated the guidelines were "'so
broad and rest on such subjective factors, that constitutionally protected religious
expression could be easily declared illicit harassment and punished."' Id. Senator
Howell Heflin feared that adoption of the EEOC proposal "'may ultimately encourage
a workplace in which religious expression and freedom are suppressed."' DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) 88 d4 (May 10, 1994). Consequently, the Senate passed, 94-0, a
resolution urging the withdrawal of the EEOC's proposal. DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA)
115 d19 (June 17, 1994). Furthermore, the House approved a proposal that would
block the EEOC from using any funds to enforce its proposal. DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) 123 d6 (June 29, 1994).
148. Laurel Bedig comments:
The Hardison decision narrowed the employer's burden to accommodate an
employee's religious practices by lowering the threshold of undue hardship,
causing many commentators to predict that employees would no longer find
significant redress for religious discrimination under Title VII. The
Court... also failed to clarify the concepts of reasonable accommodation
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Court's decision in Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook also decreased
the amount of protection afforded an employee. 4 9 Although its holding, at
first, may appear reasonable, the decision actually provides courts an important
device which they can employ to quickly terminate an employee's claim of
religious discrimination. 5 This holding, and the Court's refusal to give any
type of credence to the EEOC guidelines,' demonstrate the pro-employer
posture the Court has taken in regard to Title VII claims. This posture has
resulted in the "reduc[ed] effectiveness of Title VII."'5 2
Because of the "employer friendly" interpretation given to Title VII by
the Supreme Court in Hardison and Ansonia and the court's decision in Cook,
Reed Sussman, writing for the Boston College Law Review, believed
employees' religious beliefs would rarely, if ever, be accommodated in the
Eighth Circuit.' The Eighth Circuit's decision in Wilson is evidence that
Sussman's fears are justified. The Wilson case also provides an excellent
example of how limited an employee's rights can be in the face of a court
anxious to use the principles laid out in Ansonia v. Board of Education.
and undue hardship, thereby perpetuating different applications of the
statute among the circuits.
Bedig, supra note 47, at 246.
149. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
150. "Employers now know all they have to do is offer the bare minimum in
terms of accommodation to their employee." Bedig, supra note 47, at 248; see also
the Eighth Circuit's decision in Wilson, discussed supra notes 55-60 and accompanying
text.
151. See supra note 46.
152. Bedig, supra note 47, at 268.
153. Reed Sussman, Religious Discrimination-An Employer's Duty to
Accommodate its Employees'Religious Beliefs Under Title V1: Cook v. Chrysler
Corp., 35 B.C. L. REv. 532, in 1992-1993 Annual Survey of Labor & Employment
Law (Religious Discrimination), 35 B.C. L. REV. 349 (1994). Sussman writes:
In sum, the Eighth Circuit has interpreted section 7010) to protect the
employers and their economic interest, not the employees and their religious
beliefs. The Cook court, by resorting to a rigid, standardized two-pronged
test, has struck another harsh blow to the 'reasonable accommodation' duty,
which was already wounded by the Eight Circuit's treatment of section
701(j) in previous cases. If an employee's work schedule is governed by
any neutral policy, or if the cost of accommodating the employee outside
of that policy is more than de minimis, the employer has satisfied its
obligation under section 701(j). Barring Supreme Court intervention, it is
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The holding in Brown II is an example of a court having to stretch
existing precedent in order to protect an employee's religious practices.
Although a step in the right direction, the court's determination of what
constitutes an undue burden, while providing Mr. Brown with welcomed
protection, is unfortunately of uncertain precedential value. The Eighth
Circuit's obvious disagreement on how to apply the rule'54 and the
inconsistencies in the majority's application of the standard to the Brown
facts' leave uncertainty as to how much protection the Eighth Circuit will
afford employees in the future.'56 The court's decision in Wilson v. U.S.
West Communications, decided just three weeks before Brown II, demonstrates
the court's tendency to come down on the side of the employer.'57
Where the majority most effectively strengthens Title VII protection, however,
is in its demand that the burdens on an employer be "sufficiently real."'' 58
As it is, an employer is not required to prove much to demonstrate an undue
burden,'59 therefore it is vital that an employer prove what could be called
"actual harm."' 6  Hopefully, the court's emphasis on showing an actual
154. See supra note 141.
155. The court appeared influenced more by intuition in deciding what should and
should not be protected, instead of an objective, detached determination of when an
employer would be forced to incur an undue burden. For example, where is the undue
hardship in allowing a voluntary, short prayer, in an individual's office, at the start of
work every morning? What "sufficiently real" and tangible costs would Polk County
be forced to endure?
None of the "principles" enunciated in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison
appear to support the court's finding of an undue burden. See supra notes 35-40 and
accompanying text. A voluntary prayer would not 1) violate a collective bargaining
agreement, 2) require discrimination against other employees, or 3) require lost
efficiency or higher wages. Earle & McPherson, supra note 39, at 778.
156. There is a good deal of merit to Judge Fagg's concerns regarding what
constitutes a substantial burden and an Establishment Clause violation. See supra note
146 and accompanying text. These are important issues and should be addressed either
by Congress or the Supreme Court.
157. Admittedly, the employer in Wilson certainly presented a more compelling
case than did Polk County because of the attempts to accommodate Ms. Wilson.
Furthermore, the case was not decided by anyone of the judges who joined in Judge
Arnold's Brown II decision.
158. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 148, 150 and accompanying text.
160. When such collective bargaining agreements are present, finding an undue
burden becomes distressingly easy for the employer to show. Under these
circumstances, Reed Sussman argues for "a more sensitive inquiry into the facts of the
case." He suggests balancing equal valuation of an "employees moral commitment to
his or her religious beliefs" with the economic interests of the employer. Sussman,
supra note 153, at 541.
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burden will prove to be helpful and effective precedent for employees in the
Eighth Circuit. 6 '
The Brown I and Brown II decisions illustrate the need for a more
meaningful, practical determination of what constitutes a substantial burden.
The Brown 11 majority argued that the Constitution should protect an
individual's practice of keeping a Bible in his office. 62 Under a strict
application of the definitions laid out in Thomas or Brown I, however, the
substantial burden requirement does not seem to allow for this protection. 63
Both of these cases speak of conduct that is "mandated by religious belief,"
or "conduct that the faith requires. '" '
The Brown II majority undertakes a more sensitive approach, focusing on
how the employee perceived the government's actions. 6 This approach is
closer in line with the principles, if not the definition of "substantial burden,"
announced in Thomas. The Court there rejected the proposition that a court
should become a judge as to what an individual's sincerely held religious
beliefs require. 66 The Free Exercise Clause should not require that an
employee prove, for example, that his faith requires him to keep a Bible in his
desk or a copy of the Lord's Prayer hanging on the wall. 67 The principles
underlying the Free Exercise Clause support the majority's approach of
focusing on the sincerity of the employee's beliefs. 61
161. This should provide assistance at least until a clearer, more protective,
interpretation is enunciated by the United States Supreme Court, the EEOC, or
Congress. Of course, the Supreme Court has shown that it will not hesitate to ignore
EEOC recommendations. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
162. Brown 11, 61 F.3d at 659.
163. Compare Sherbert v. Verner and Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec.
Div, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), where the plaintiff was forced to choose between
unemployment benefits and their religious activity.
164. See supra notes 87 and 114 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 125-45 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
167. The state can still show that its interests in not having such items in the
office outweigh the employee's interests. An employer should, however, at least have
the opportunity to reach this stage of the analysis, instead of being pre-empted from
further consideration because he or she did not meet a strict application of the
substantial burden requirement, as was the case in Brown L
168. The court should, of course, have the discretion to determine whether an
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V. CONCLUSION
The manner in which the Brown majority analyzed Brown's Free
Exercise and Title VII claim represents a step in the right direction. The Free
Exercise Clause should afford protection to those religious practices conducted
as a result of sincerely held religious beliefs. 69  If a substantial burden
exists, the state may still show that its actions are constitutional through an
application of the Pickering analysis. Furthermore, the court's emphasis on
forcing employers to show an actual burden which cannot be reasonably
accommodated is essential for Title VII to provide any practical protection.
This approach affords protection and respect to the employee's religious
beliefs and furthers the principles for which Title VII and the Free Exercise
Clause stand.
ROBERT F. EPPERSON, JR.
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